evolution: relatively long periods of stability (equilibrium), punctuated by compact periods of qualitative, metamorphic change (revolution). In every model, the interrelationship of these two modes is explained through the construct of a highly durable underlying order or deep structure. This deep structure is what persists and limits change during equilibrium periods, and it is what disassembles, reconfigures, and enforces wholesale transformation during revolutionary punctuations. The tables in this section use the theorists' own words to document the degree to which these six models share the same paradigm and to show some of the specific features of each level of analysis. Table 1 provides an overview of the six theories and suggests the range of fields in which the same paradigm has emerged. The statement of commonalities at the top of the table offers a summary definition of the basic paradigm, derived from all the models. A look at the excerpts below it shows the striking similarities (and some differences) across models. Table 2 shows how each theorist differentiates his or her model from traditional counterparts and indicates the extent to which this paradigm challenges premises inherent in traditional theories. Three main distinctions emerge. First, theorists contrast their work against concepts of change as a gradual blending of one form into another. This difference is not a simple question of the pace of change, as evenly spaced versus unevenly clumped. Gradualist paradigms imply that systems can "accept" virtually any change, any time, as long as it is small enough; big changes result from the insensible accumulation of small ones. In contrast, punctuated equilibrium suggests that, for most of systems' histories, there are limits beyond which "change is actively prevented, rather than always potential but merely suppressed because no adaptive advantage would accrue" (Gould, 1989: 124) .
The Punctuated Equilibrium Paradigm and How It Differs from Traditional Paradigms
These models also dispute the ideas that (1) individual systems of the same type all develop along the same path and (2) systems develop in "forward" directions, as in the universal stage theories that dominate the current literatures on group and organizational development. Punctuated equilibria are not smooth trajectories toward pre-set ends because both the specific composition of a system and the "rules" governing how its parts interact may change unpredictably during revolutionary punctuations. "The definition of the system is . . . liable to be modified by its evolution" (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984: 189) .
These models suggest that conflicting theories about organizational adaptability (such as resource dependency, Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) , and organizational rigidity (such as population ecology, Hannan & Freeman, 1977 , 1984 are applicable at different times, depending on whether a system is in a period of transition or equilibrium. Finally, they suggest we use caution in applying theories based on universal "drivers" such as efficiency Commonalities: Systems evolve through the alternation of periods of equilibrium, in which persistent underlying structures permit only incremental change, and periods of revolution, in which these underlying structures are fundamentally altered. Individuals: Levinson (1978: 49) The life structure evolves through a relatively orderly sequence ... [of] stable (structurebuilding) periods and transitional (structure-changing) periods. Groups: Gersick (1988) Teams progress in a pattern of "punctuated equilibrium," through alternating inertial change and revolution in the behaviors and themes through which they approach their work. Organizations: Tushman & Romanelli (1985: 171) Organizations evolve through convergent periods punctuated by strategic reorientations (or recreations) which demark and set bearings for the next convergent period. Scientific Fields: Kuhn (1970 The "historical" path along which the system evolves. . . is characterized by a succession of stable regions, where deterministic laws dominate, and of instable ones, near the bifurcation points, where the system can "choose" between or among more than one possible future.
(e.g., see Williamson, 1983: 125) , by proposing that systems' basic organizing principles are varied and changeable. Tables 3, 4 , and 5 display excerpted summaries of the three main components of the punctuated equilibrium paradigm: deep structure, equilibrium periods, and revolutionary periods. The first of these, deep structure, is the most critical for understanding the models, and it is the hardest concept to define and communicate. (Kuhn, 1970: 174-210 , and Levinson, 1986 , discussed some of the difficulties.)
Deep Structure
Each theorist explains this concept in language specific to his or her own research domain; I use the term deep structure (Chomsky, 1966) for its general appropriateness. The six sources together suggest a general explanation of its meaning. Systems with deep structure share two characteristics: (1) they have differentiated parts and (2) the units that comprise them "work": they exchange resources with the environment in ways that maintain-and are controlled by-this differentiation (see Prigogine & Stengers, 1984: 154, 287 ). Deep structure is the set of fundamental "choices" a system has made of (1) the basic parts into which its units will be organized and (2) the basic activity patterns that will maintain its existence. Deep structures are highly stable for two general reasons. First, like a decision Table 3 , Biological Species), the activity patterns of a system's deep structure reinforce the system as a whole, through mutual feedback loops.
As Table 3 suggests, different kinds of systems face different "menus" of choices about how they will organize and run themselves. Identifying these sets of choices (which become the components of each system's deep structure) is an important part of theory building for specific punctuational models. For example, Tushman and Romanelli (1985) described five kinds of structural and performance choices that make up organizations' deep structures; Levinson (1978) , Gersick (1988) , and Kuhn (1970) described categories of choices for individuals, groups, and scientific disciplines, respectively (see Table 3 ). This approach differs critically from that of universal stage theorists, who seek commonalities in the outcomes of choices and dismiss individual differences as "noise" (Gersick, 1988) . Punctuational models identify common choice categories, but allow for infinite variety in individual systems' particular solutions. This is the difference between saying, for example, that all project groups progress through "forming, storming, norming, and performing" (Tuckman, 1965) and saying that all project groups are challenged to choose boundaries, norms, and work methods, but they vary in the sequence and manner in which they settle those choices.
Equilibrium Periods
If deep structure may be thought of as the design of the playing field and the rules of the game, then equilibrium periods might be compared loosely to a game in play. The stable integrity of the field and the rules and, thus, of the game itself does not mean that play is uninteresting, that every match is the same, or that scores and performances are static.
Within equilibrium periods, the system's basic organization and activity patterns stay the same; the equilibrium period consists of maintaining and carrying out these choices. As implied above, what "carrying out" means is different for different types of systems. In systems without intentionality, it can be a mechanical set of activities or a series of minor adjustments to the environment. Levinson, Gersick, Tushman and Romanelli, and Kuhn described the refinements and incremental steps human systems take during equilibrium periods, as they work to achieve goals built into their deep structures (see Table 4 ).
Systems in equilibrium also make incremental adjustments to compensate for internal or external perturbations without changing their deep structures (see Wake, Roth, & Wake, 1983) . A classic example is provided by Citibank's "back office" efforts to process increasing floods of paper- It is important to note that human systems in equilibrium may look turbulent enough to mask the stability of the underlying deep structure. For example, a young adult's life structure may include the fundamental choice to test a variety of occupational options, resulting in a pattern of job changes that appears chaotic (Levinson, 1978) . A project group may choose implicitly to subvert its task, or an organization may commit to a strategy it is not well equipped to accomplish, resulting in patterns of overt conflict, vacillation, or failure. However, the deep structure of chosen goals and activities remains in place.
One of the major questions generated by the punctuated equilibrium paradigm concerns the inertia that maintains a system's equilibrium. For organization theorists, a salient form of this question is: Why is it so hard for systems to make major changes? Tushman and Romanelli (1985) reviewed the impressive organizational literature on this observation. The theorists included here discussed three barriers to radical change in human systems: cognition, motivation, and obligation.
Gersick, Tushman and Romanelli, Kuhn, Eldredge and Gould, and Prigogine and Stengers all discussed cognitive frameworks and the thoroughness with which they shape human awareness, interpretation of reality, and consideration of actions. As Kuhn stated, phenomena "that will not fit the box are often not seen at all" (1970: 24). Limits on the awareness of alternatives constrain change in behavior (Simon, 1976) .
Several theorists also discussed motivational barriers to change. Levinson (1978) described the pain of loss, the uncertainty, and the fear of failure that accompany the anticipation of terminating a life structure and trying to define a new one. Gersick (1989) offered examples of groups' reluctance to take new steps in their projects, based on wishes to avoid losing opportunities, losing power struggles, or failing at more difficult tasks. Kuhn (1970: 78) described scientists' readiness to append "ad hoc modifications" to their theories, in an effort to erase contradictions which, if appreciated, could discredit their lives' work. The sunk costs incurred during a period of equilibrium, and fears of losing control over one's situation if the equilibrium ends, contribute heavily to the human motivation to avoid significant system change.
Lastly, Levinson (1978) , Tushman and Romanelli (1985) , and Kuhn (1970) discussed the inertial constraints of obligations among stakeholders inside and outside a system. Levinson's (1986) portrayal of the life structure as a set of relationships (see Table 3 ) points up how pervasively a system may be bound by others' expectations and needs. Kuhn (1970: 35) noted the inertial effects that scientific communities exert by carefully socializing students, granting legitimacy only to certain problems, and responding to research findings that fall outside the paradigm as failures that "reflect not on nature but on the scientist." As Tushman and Romanelli (1985: 177) suggested, even if a system overcomes its own cognitive and motivational barriers against realizing a need for change, the "networks of interdependent resource relationships and value commitments" generated by its structure often prevent its being able to change.
A final explanation for the stability of equilibrium periods is that systems benefit from this kind of persistence. For human systems, these benefits have to do with the ability to pursue goals and accomplish work. According to Kuhn (1970: 25) , the practice of normal science-which prescribes what methods to use and promises that certain questions will ultimately reward pursuit-facilitates the solution of "problems that [scientists] could scarcely have imagined and would never have undertaken without commitment to the paradigm." This insight about normal science is paralleled for entrepreneurs, managers, task groups, and organizations when they respond to obstacles by inventing ways to persist with their goals, not by changing their basic direction. Tushman and Romanelli (1985: 195) , whose model defines equilibria as periods during which organizations become more internally consistent, proposed an additional reason for the adaptability of inertia. They suggested that "selection processes favor . . . organizations whose strategic orientations are consistent with internal and external environmental demands." When the environment is reasonably stable, organizations that maintain equilibrium should become more and more thoroughly adapted to carry out their missions. By sticking to a course, a system can become skilled at what it does.
Revolutionary Periods
The third major component of the punctuated equilibrium paradigm is the revolutionary period. The difference between the incremental changes of equilibrium periods and revolutionary changes is like the difference between changing the game of basketball by moving the hoops higher and changing it by taking the hoops away. The first kind of change leaves the game's deep structure intact. The second dismantles it. The definitive assertion in this paradigm is that systems do not shift from one kind of game to another through incremental steps: such transformations occur through wholesale upheaval.
The discussions in the previous two sections should help explain why incremental changes in a system's parts would not alter the whole. As long as the deep structure is intact, it generates a strong inertia, first to prevent the system from generating alternatives outside its own boundaries, then to pull any deviations that do occur back into line. According to this logic, the deep structure must first be dismantled, leaving the system temporarily disorganized, in order for any fundamental changes to be accomplished. Next, a subset of the system's old pieces, along with some new pieces, can be put back together into a new configuration, which operates according to a new set of rules.
The example of removed basketball hoops suggests how changes to the core of a system's deep structure affect the whole system. The contrast with The theorists covered here offer complementary reasons why human systems generate internal sources of strain and misalignment. Human systems tend to outgrow the deep structures that govern their perspectives and activities. As Levinson (1978) pointed out, a life structure appropriate for the developmental tasks of a man of 20, just becoming independent of his parents and entering adulthood, cannot meet the same man's needs when he is 30 and concerned with pursuing his own career and family. A project group's framework for starting a task is seldom appropriate to carry through the entire project (Gersick, 1988 ). An organization's growth strains its exist-ing structures and practices (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985) . Kuhn (1970) argued that the very pursuit of normal science makes paradigms obsolete, either by answering the interesting questions (and becoming routine engineering) or by finally running up against puzzles that the paradigm was never equipped to solve. In human systems, a deep structure formed at the beginning of a period is shaped by members' inexperience, their need to get started, and their untested expectations and goals. Eventually, human systems finish their deep structures' agenda, uncover their inadequacies, and generate new needs that the old structures cannot meet.
The external environment presents a less orderly source of change. Levinson (1978) . Punctuated equilibrium models suggest that failures may be extremely important in setting the stage for revolutionary change. But as long as events occur against the backdrop of the same deep structure, they are treated or interpreted in ways that preserve the system's inertia and, therefore, incremental solutions are sought. The handwriting on the wall cannot be read; events do not indicate to system members what they ought to be doing differently. It may be more useful to think of certain kinds of failures -those engendered by misalignments within a system's deep structure or between its deep structure and its environment-not as sufficient causes, but as major sources of energy for revolutionary change. Revolutions themselves seem to require decisive breaks in systems' inertia.
THE DYNAMICS OF REVOLUTIONS: OPPORTUNITIES FOR SYNERGY ACROSS MODELS
Having explained punctuated equilibrium in general, I would like to suggest the potential benefits that can be gained by comparing models from diverse domains. This section of the article attempts to take a step in that direction by examining one area, the dynamics of revolutionary change processes in organizational settings. The previous outline of revolutionary This analysis complements Tushman and Romanelli's identification of "performance pressures . . . whether anticipated or actual" (1985: 179) as the fundamental agents of organizational reorientation. Tushman, Newman, and Romanelli (1986) described as typical the scenario of an organization falling into serious trouble before responding by replacing its top management. They found that "externally recruited executives are more than three times more likely to initiate frame-breaking change than existing executive teams" (1986: 42).
Failures caused by inappropriate deep structures are destined to elude the (misdirected) efforts of current system members to correct them. Unless such failures kill the system, they command increasing attention and raise the likelihood that newcomers will either be attracted or recruited to help solve the problems. The newcomer has the opportunity to see the system in an entirely different context than incumbent members, and he or she may begin problem solving on a new path.
It is then the newcomer's explicit task to break the old deep structure and establish a new one. In scientific revolutions, Kuhn (1970) This view is supported by research on the Einstellung effect: people's tendency to persist with the same approach to a problem or series of problems whether or not that approach is productive (Luchins, 1940 ). Ericsson and Simon reported (1984: 129) that such persistence is not inadvertent, but a deliberate choice to continue a strategy as long as the task appears to be the same. They found that "a number of experiments have reduced the Einstellung effect by marking the test problems as separate problems rather than a continuation of the sequence of problems presented before." Persistence as well as its converse are thus explained. When people feel that a temporal era has ended, they may consciously decide that the approaches they chose for that era are no longer valid. When individuals and groups are reminded, by temporal milestones, that their time is finite, they feel a sense of urgency to reevaluate past choices, pursue aspirations they have put off, and take new steps. A second CEO's description of his company's response to a series of product failures illustrates that even serious, repeated problems can be persistently misdiagnosed for long periods of time. Until a temporal milestone gave this company the opportunity to redefine its product at a deepstructure level, the problems were seen as peripheral to the business:
Six months ago, we had "tacky engineering problems," and we treated 'em [ This section of the article has dealt with triggers of revolutionary periods: conditions that break a system's inertia and thereby allow revolutions to begin. According to Kuhn and Tushman and Romanelli, a system's members usually are unable to do this. When internal and/or external events make a system's deep structure obsolete, it usually takes a crisis, and the subsequent attraction of newcomers, to intervene and end equilibrium periods. In contrast, Levinson and Gersick suggested that when system members feel they have time limits, they set temporal boundaries determining when equilibrium periods will end, at which points they initiate their own transitions.
The contrast between these scenarios suggests the value of research to explore (1) whether temporal mechanisms are involved in the few cases where incumbents in organizations initiate their own reorientations and (2) whether there are ways, besides waiting for temporal milestones or replacing executives, to help organizational systems close equilibrium periods when revolutionary change is needed.
How Do Systems Function During Revolutionary Periods?
During equilibrium periods, organizational systems may make incremental changes because members want to try something new. This is not the case for change of revolutionary dimensions. System members do not begin revolutionary periods because they have a specific new idea to try, but because their equilibrium has been broken. Since they are no longer directed by their old deep structures, and do not yet have future directions, system members experience uncertainty, often accompanied by powerful feelings. This section of the article begins with the role of emotion in transition dynamics and moves to the related issues of environmental contact, cognition, and the dispersal of transitional changes throughout the system. Although transitions' outcomes are inherently unpredictable, the following points suggest some ways that future research might increase our chances to manage them well.
The role of emotion. Even in project groups of one hour's duration, the perception that a transition is imminent can pack a punch: "Once it passes the halfway point, that's when the panic sets in" (group member, quoted in Gersick, 1989: 287). Levinson (1978: 86) For example, the direct observation of project groups reveals a particular interplay of emotions and actions during successful transitions. In groups that move ahead at their transitions, the jolt of urgency registered at the midpoint usually includes enough fear of not finishing to help members complete agendas that have been productive, drop agendas that have not, and, at least temporarily, suspend power struggles. Although the choice of the midpoint (or some other milestone) may be calculated, part of its power to stop a group's equilibrium may well lie in the emotions people feel upon reaching it: research shows that strong negative emotion "interrupts . .. the normal program of behavior" (Isen, 1984: 180) .
At the same time, such groups appear to feel enough optimism to initiate fresh search activities and to move forward on the basis of new ideas. Optimism is important because, as Kuhn (1970) and Tushman and Romanelli (1985) stressed, there is no way to prove, during a revolutionary period, that an idea will succeed. At inception, the central premises of a new paradigm or new strategic configuration are necessarily untested; their merit can only be demonstrated as the system rebuilds around them in the equilibrium period to come.
Kuhn further proposed that, among ideas competing to provide new scientific paradigms, the choice may ultimately rest on aesthetic appeal; an idea must feel right, at least to a small group, who will then risk investing the energy to pursue it. Tushman et al. (1986) discussed the importance of top executives' abilities to inspire confidence and enthusiasm for the new direction. Without an adequate combination of urgency and optimism, organizational systems at transition points may cling to old patterns, even while they clearly recognize the need to change, or they may simply quit. This hypothesis suggests the value of research on the effects of combined negative and positive emotions on performance, in situations calling for punctuational changes or turnarounds.
Environmental contact. Urgency and optimism may also be important to another phenomenon that is often critical to transition dynamics: the influence of outsiders. Levinson (1978: 109) discussed important roles played by "transitional figures." These are people with whom adults in transition form special relationships, from whom they gain encouragement and learn new ways to live and work. Gersick (1988) found a similar occurrence of special interaction between project groups in transition and their external supervisors. Over half of the naturally occurring teams observed actively sought outside assistance during transition periods, partly to get help making choices and moving forward, and partly to check external requirements and increase the chances that their products would succeed in their environments. Previously this article reviewed the key role played by outsiders who are attracted or recruited to solve revolutionary crises in scientific disciplines and in organizations. Eisenhardt's (1989) research, showing the importance of a "trusted advisor" in helping organizations make major decisions fast and effectively, suggests transitional figures may also be critical in organizational reorientations where top executives remain in place.
The cognitive confusion and emotional distress of revolutionary periods may propel systems to seek outside help or to be especially receptive to outside influence at that time. The benefits provided by outsiders may include new cognitive perspectives, fresh awareness about the environment, and an energizing reassurance. Research on the role of outside advisors, and the effects of contrasting emotions in both help-seeking and helpproviding behavior, may have important implications for the management of organizational transitions.
Cognition and the dynamics of insight. There is a moment that can be directly observed in project groups (Gersick, 1989) , and occasionally documented in scientific disciplines (e.g., Gould, 1977) , when a system in transition turns from confusion toward clarity. The system pivots on the insight around which a new deep structure will crystallize. It is clear that the articulation of a new vision is also central to organizational reorientation (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985) . The six models examined here suggest several facets of this complex phenomenon.
Kuhn and Prigogine and his colleagues emphasize the unpredictability of a system in transition. Kuhn (1970) noted that perception is a subjective phenomenon: there is always more than one plausible way to interpret reality. Prigogine and Stengers (1984: 176) pointed to the objective unpredictability of the transition system itself, stating that it may follow "a number of equally possible paths," the choice of which will depend on a random fluctuation. In marked contrast to the relative predictability of equilibrium conditions, neither the mechanics of human cognition nor the system itself absolutely "dictates" the outcome of a transition.
The situation, in line with the thinking of these theorists, is something like an Escher print: it incorporates several pictures simultaneously, none of which system members can distinguish as the transition begins. Prigogine's colleague Haken referred to this as symmetry, and he referred to the event that resolves it as symmetry breaking: The construct of symmetry breaking helps researchers to understand the dawn of insight during transitions. Given a piece of information that provides a new way to look at it, a confusing puzzle can resolve into a coherent picture seemingly instantly. During the very swift transitions that can occur in project groups, this metaphor fits people's experience of things "falling into place." In more complex transitions, Kuhn and Gould offered intriguingly similar descriptions of the revolutionary turn toward a new structure beginning with a "keystone" (Kuhn, 1970: 56) or "key adaptation" (Gould, 1980: 191) . In these cases, the new direction does not emerge all at once; instead, a catalytic change opens the door to it. Kuhn described critical insights that sometimes show the way to novel paths of investigation, leading to new paradigms. Gould described initial mutations that thrust a group of organisms into a new mode of life, thereby subjecting them to novel selective pressures, which then work toward full emergence of the new species.
Note that this model of insight formation illuminates some critical differences between the punctuated equilibrium paradigm and traditional universal-stage models of system evolution. First, systems' particular histories matter, because histories determine the unique array of information and conditions from which system members can select their new direction-the jumping-off place for the transition (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984) . Second, systems' futures are unpredictable: the information used to "break the symmetry" of the transition period may come from a random environmental event or circumstance. These aspects of transitions both inject chance into the development process and explain how systems can adapt to entirely new features in their environments, rather than merely following their own teleology.
In the first section of the article, I described the relative speed with which transitions unfold and offered some general explanations for it. Why should people find insight quickly during transitions? The sheer urgency and discomfort of being without a functioning structure lend intensity to the search for new solutions. The dismantling of the old deep structure frees system members to search for symmetry-breaking information in new fields and to perceive material that they already knew in new ways. Further, as Tushman and his colleagues (1986) pointed out, an organization in transition is unstable on a number of fronts. If a new order does not take control relatively quickly, numerous vested interests may pull it toward its old structure; transition periods may end quickly by default.
A final contributor to the swift development of insight during transitions may have to do with the effects of time-awareness on perception. In their article on managerial problem solving and social cognition, Kiesler and Sproull (1982) noted that individuals automatically and continuously notice time and segment streams of stimuli into coherent units. The fineness of this segmentation and, thus, the level of abstraction and detail that is perceived, changes automatically, in predictable ways. For example, experts segment events less finely and, thus, see "whole pictures"; conditions of uncertainty lead people to segment events much more finely, as they comb their surroundings for information.
Automatic changes in segmentation may be very important in the development of insight during transitions, especially transitions stimulated by temporal milestones. As system members perceive one era of their time to have closed and another era to have opened before them, their segmentation of the past and distant future should broaden. As those periods resolve into coherent blocks, system members' vision may shift suddenly from the trees to the forest. In project teams, this can be seen in members' characteristic transition summaries of what they have been doing and what is most important about where they need to go (Gersick, 1989) . Simultaneously, the uncertainty of the transition may cause system members to segment the information that is immediately before them more finely. With that kind of search, according to Kiesler and Sproull, choices are made more rapidly.
The formation of insight is an important part of revolutionary periods in human systems. The dynamics of this process should be fertile soil for research on how to understand and foster the kind of divergent thinking that is critical for creative problem solving in general.
The dispersal of revolutionary change through the system. As Prigogine and Stengers noted (1984: 187), no one change can convert an entire system instantaneously. They portray reorganizations as beginning with a "nucleus," where the change must first become established firmly before it can take over the rest of the system. Furthermore, they reported that the more efficient a system's communication mechanisms are, the stronger and larger the nucleus must be if it is to result in a systemwide change, instead of being damped by its surroundings. Eldredge and Gould (1972) hypothesized similarly that speciation must begin rapidly and in populations that are small enough and isolated enough for the change to take hold, in order to avoid being diluted by the parent population.
It is intriguing to compare these ideas with the importance accorded top-executive teams in the work of Tushman and his colleagues. They proposed that, although convergent change during equilibrium periods can be managed through broad participation, top teams are the only instigators strong enough to mount successful reorientations (Tushman et al., 1986) . It may be fruitful to explore whether executive teams who lead reorientations experience or seek isolation (either physical or social) from their own organizations, so that they can formulate changes and develop commitment to new directions.
How Do Revolutionary Periods Conclude?
It is essential to distinguish firmly between the processes of change in revolutionary periods and their outcomes-the new deep structures they bring about. One reason for this separation is that the substantive changes with which revolutionary periods conclude may differ widely in type, success, and scope. For example, Tushman and Romanelli (1985: 173, 179) found that reorientations, where "strategies, power, structure and systems" change, are less radical than recreations, where the "core values which govern decision premises" are also transformed. Levinson (1978) reported that transitions from one great era in life to the next (e.g., the age 40 transition, between the eras of early and middle adulthood) are broader in magnitude than within-era transitions (e.g., at ages 30 and 50). The group transitions that Gersick observed correspond to the milder kind of revolutions because they were contained within projects; more difficult revolutions must bridge wider gaps, as when one major project ends and another must be initiated. Revolutionary periods may also vary in how much they benefit or harm a system. Levinson, Gersick, and Tushman and his colleagues all observed that a system may change significantly for the worse during a transition. This is consistent with the punctuated equilibrium paradigm's implication that systems do not inevitably evolve toward improvement.
Apart from the issues noted above, findings in two of the models examined here suggest that there are good reasons to keep revolutionary periods conceptually separate from revolutionary changes themselves. Levinson and Gersick have observed that a system may go through a clear, time-limited transition period, experiencing many of the unsettling processes described earlier, yet it can emerge at the end without having accomplished revisions in its deep structure. Both authors suggested that systems may undergo only mild change if their deep structures need little adjustment at the time the transition occurs. However, when system members back away from change "because of resignation, inertia, passivity, or despair" (Levinson, 1978: 52) , the closing of the transitional opportunity often brings a sense of failure or stagnation. This emotional tone, and the absence of needed alterations, are likely to result in a period of persisting decline, lasting until the next transition or beyond (Gersick, 1989; Levinson, 1978) .
These two models differ from that of Tushman and his colleagues, who define reorientations in terms of the changes themselves. According to Gersick's and Levinson's findings, systems that have undergone unsuccessful or abortive transitions are, indeed, different after revolutionary periods because they are weakened; however, such transitions would be invisible to researchers who are looking for new strategies or structures. The difference in Tushman and his colleague's definition of the construct may be a methodological artifact. Their use of historical archives to identify organizational reorientations, although offering the considerable advantage of access to larger samples, would seldom permit researchers a view of transition processes or of abortive transitions. This issue has implications for practice and research and suggests the value of identifying organizational-level indicators that transition periods are underway. Only by separating the construct of a revolutionary period from accomplished changes is it possible to locate and study systems as they undergo transitions, when intervention may be most important, rather than waiting until the changes are complete.
DISCUSSION
The punctuated equilibrium paradigm offers a new lens through which theorists can make fresh discoveries about how managers, work groups, organizations, and industries both develop over time and react to changes in their environments. The construct of a deep structure that keeps systems basically stable during equilibrium periods offers a new way to understand systems' resistance to change. The idea that major change occurs through difficult, compact revolutions provokes interesting research questions and indicates the practical demands of adaptation to severe alterations in a system's environment or in its own growth. The emergence of the same paradigm in diverse fields has implications for theory and research methodology.
Methodological Implications
Methodological differences may account for some of the variety in different theorists' findings, and different methods may be needed to answer different questions. Levinson used intensive biographical interviews, which afforded him (1) the panoramic views of men's lives needed to place specific events within broad eras of continuity and change and (2) the intimate detail needed to create a rich portrait of the human experience of building structures and undergoing transitions. Turnover would present obstacles to using this technique at the organizational level. However, in those key organizations that kept their executive teams through reorientation periods, this type of interviewing would be invaluable for understanding the dynamics involved.
Gersick worked with more short-lived systems than individuals or organizations. The observation of project groups' entire life spans offered opportunities to study equilibrium and transition processes directly. The finding that transitions can be observed in brief laboratory simulations means that controlled hypothesis testing about these processes is possible (Gersick, 1989) . It is difficult to establish naturalistic conditions in the laboratory, but good organizational simulations do exist (e.g., "Looking Glass", McCall & Lombardo, 1978) . Laboratory studies could be especially useful for testing hypotheses on organizational stability and change and for trying intervention strategies.
The collection of documentary histories over very long time periods and for large, diverse samples by Kuhn and Tushman and his colleaguessimilar to the study of fossil records by Eldredge and Gould-offers opportunities for insight about the structural conditions under which revolutionary change occurs and succeeds or fails. It affords a view of how revolutionary changes may spread to their surroundings or, in the case of defunct systems, of how they die out. Even though documentary data may be less available for individual and group histories, the work of these researchers suggests the rewards of using archives to study broad sets of structural variables among large samples.
Finally, the complementarity of these six models suggests the need and possibilities for multilevel research. Revolutionary change in large systems ultimately depends on comparably radical change among individuals and groups; conversely, individuals and groups attempting to make radical changes must be affected by the deep structures of the systems in which they are embedded.
Limitations of the Paradigm
There are at least two fundamental cautions to follow in applying the punctuated equilibrium paradigm. The first is to avoid assuming it is the only way systems change. Gould and Eldredge (1977: 19) themselves "never claimed either that gradualism could not occur in theory or did not occur in fact. Nature is far too varied and complex for such absolutes." Wake and his associates (1983) proposed that behavioral plasticity allows organisms to compensate for environmental changes without changing morphologically. In organizations, punctuational patterns may be most evident in systems that have confining deep structures; they may be least evident in highly flexible systems. Existing theory provides us with a ready-made map of how organizational structures vary on this dimension, from bureaucracies (Burns & Stalker, 1961 ) to clans (Ouchi & Price, 1978) and to "commitment strategy organizations" (Walton & Hackman, 1986 ). Weick's (1976) "loosely coupled systems," with their low internal interdependence, may be the least likely to fit the punctuated equilibrium paradigm.
The second caution is to avoid applying models from one research domain to another too freely or literally. Human systems, self-aware and goal-directed, have the capacity to "schedule" their own opportunities for revolutionary change (as with time-triggered transitions), to solicit outside perspectives, and to manage their histories in ways that are inconceivable for nonconscious systems. Much as theories from different domains have to offer each other, it would be a mistake to import constructs uncritically, rather than to use them to provoke questions about how they might apply in other settings.
Grand Theory
I have suggested specific research implications of each model examined here for the others. However, the most important implications of the punctuated equilibrium paradigm are suggested by the very diversity of the fields that have been affected by it. Scientists' assumptions about what change is and how it works must fundamentally influence how research is designed and how findings are interpreted. The punctuated equilibrium paradigm suggests three basic questions that can be asked of almost any model or set of findings: Do these data reflect a system in equilibrium or in transition? Do they depend on characteristics inherent in the system's parts, or in the deep structure that organizes them? How far can these conclusions be expected to hold, should the system undergo radical change?
Prigogine and Stengers (1984: 207) (see Table 2 ), writing from the vantage point of physics, have argued that traditional deterministic paradigms have had "particularly unfortunate" effects on the social sciences. According to these authors, the search for optimizing, predictive trajectories that can be extrapolated to infinity is misguided because such approaches account neither for the extremes to which inertia may drive a system nor for the unpredictability of radical changes that rewrite the rules of the game. Finally, as Gould (1985) noted, efforts to unravel a system's workings by minutely dissecting its parts miss the point when the parts' behavior is determined by the deep structure that organizes them.
For organizational researchers and practitioners, there is the added challenge to the beliefs about how organizational systems can accomplish (or be helped to accomplish) change. On the one hand, the punctuated equilibrium paradigm proposes that fundamental change cannot be accomplished piecemeal, slowly, gradually, and comfortably. On the other hand, it holds promise that we may someday create new organizational forms that have not yet been imagined.
